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Resumen: El concepto de dignidad humana se en-
cuentra en el fundamento de muchas declaraciones 
de derechos humanos, tanto nacionales como inter-
nacionales. Esta idea, basada en la racionalidad del 
hombre  –ya presente en la Antigüedad grecorroma-
na–, se desarrolló plenamente en el cristianismo, en su 
síntesis con la concepción bíblica del hombre imagen 
de Dios. Con la secularización de la cultura europea 
desde el siglo XVIII en adelante, la justificación de la 
dignidad humana se torna problemática. El intento 
más influyente para justificarla  por medio de la racio-
nalidad secular es el que proporciona Kant, que ve la 
dignidad del hombre como derivada de su capacidad 
de razonamiento moral y de la cual provienen las 
nociones de autonomía e igualdad. Sin embargo, la 
cultura secularizada de los dos últimos siglos produjo 
actitudes de escepticismo tanto hacia el concepto 
judeocristiano como hacia el kantiano de la intrínseca 
dignidad del hombre, que facilitarían en última instan-
cia los totalitarismos del siglo XX. Tras los horrores del 
nazismo, la preocupación por colocar los derechos 
humanos en el centro de la cultura, la política y el 
derecho animaría la búsqueda ―en buena medida 
imposible― de una idea de dignidad humana común a 
las distintas tradiciones filosóficas, tanto religiosas 
como seculares. Durante el período posterior a la 
Segunda Guerra Mundial, especialmente con el Conci-
lio Vaticano II, se presencia igualmente un renovado 
descubrimiento de los derechos humanos basados en 
la dignidad humana por parte del catolicismo, que, a la 
vista de las diferentes tendencias reduccionistas o 
destructivas de la cultura secularizada, resulta tal vez la 
perspectiva más satisfactoria. Finalmente, se examina 
el problema de la libertad religiosa como un aspecto 
particularmente iluminador de la reflexión sobre la 
dignidad humana. 
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Abstract: The concept of human dignity lies at the 
heart of many national and international conventions 
of human rights. This idea, based on man's rationality, 
can be found already in Greco-Roman Antiquity, was 
fully developed in Christianity, in its synthesis with the 
Biblical conception of man as image of God. With the 
secularization of the European mind from the 18th 
century onwards, the justification of human dignity 
becomes problematic. This most influential attempt to 
justify it by secular rationality came from Kant, who 
saw man’s dignity as deriving from his capacity for 
moral reasoning and from it came the notions of 
autonomy and equality. However, during the last two 
centuries, secularized cultures produced skeptical 
attitudes toward both the Judeo-Christian and Kantian 
concepts of the intrinsic dignity of man, which eventu-
ally paved the way for twentieth-century totalitarian-
isms. After the horrors of Nazism, concerns about 
putting human rights in the centre of culture, politics 
and law compelled a search ―largely impossible― for 
a common idea of human dignity, shared by different 
philosophical traditions, both religious and secular. 
During the years after World War II, especially after 
the Second Vatican Council, there was a renewed 
discovery of human rights as based on human dignity 
by Catholicism, which, in view of the different reduc-
tionist or destructive tendencies found in the secular-
ized culture, perhaps is the most satisfactory ap-
proach. Finally, the problem of religious freedom is 
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t might seem self-evident that human beings, simply because of 
their humanity, possess a special dignity that sets them apart 
from all other creatures in the world, including primates and 
other mammals. It also seems self-evident that their common dignity 
underlies their basic equality. Certainly, in Western societies, at least 
since the Second World War and the revelation of the horrors of the Hol-
ocaust, there has been a growing awareness of the fundamental dignity 
and equality of all people whatever their gender, race or religion. ‘Hu-
man Dignity’ has been explicitly mentioned as the underlying principle 
in many human rights conventions, such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), and in some state constitutions and not least the 
German Basic Law as we shall see below. 
These strong affirmations of the fundamental importance of human 
dignity as the basis of human rights and equality are understandable 
given the context in which they were written: the tragic Nazi dehumani-
zation of Jews, Slavs, Gypsies, the physically and mentally disabled, and 
homosexuals. The seemingly straightforward understanding of human 
dignity, however, masked the ambiguous and contested nature of the 
concept even in the late 1940s, when the UDHR and the Basic Law were 
drawn up. ‘Human Dignity’ became a kind of catch-all concept that suc-
ceeded in papering over profound theological and philosophical differ-
ences. 
Underlying these different ways of thinking about human dignity 
are distinctive anthropologies, each of which has its own conception of 
man and his place in the world: in the committee which drew up the 
UDHR, Catholic neo-Thomism (represented by Jacques Maritain), jostled 
with neo-Kantian secular humanism and even Confucianism1. It might be 
true to say all these protagonists were united in what they were oppos-
ing: the Nazi racist ideology with its cult of the Master Race, partially 
derived from Nietzsche’s philosophy, and its attempted destruction of 
entire categories of people. They were, however, less agreed on the posi-
tive content of human dignity. It was undoubtedly necessary at the time 
to paper over these differences in order to arrive at a common agree-
ment. As Jacques Maritain himself stated in speaking about the work of 
this committee: «Yes, we agree about the rights but on condition that no-
                                                 
1
 McCrudden, 2013a, p. 2. 
I 
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one asks us why»2. But it is actually not surprising that today the very 
concept itself is sometimes deemed to be worthless. This judgement in 
fact was already adopted in the 19th century by Schopenhauer and, later, 
by Nietzsche. Some would say that ‘dignity’ should be applied only to 
those human beings who display certain characteristics, such as con-
sciousness, usefulness, or the ability to enjoy life thus excluding people 
in comas, or suffering from mental or physical handicaps. The concept is 
also used in diametrically opposed ways: to justify euthanasia, same-sex 
marriage, abortion and even infanticide or to deny them. The problem is 
that if one denies there all human beings possess dignity, that is special 
and unique simply in virtue of their humanity, their membership of the 
human species, what does human rights mean? And if some human be-
ings are thought less dignified than others, how can one categorically 
oppose crimes against humanity?3 This article will explore these different 
conceptions from the Catholic philosophical perspective known as ‘inte-
gral humanism’ or ‘personalism’. It will argue that human dignity can 
only be adequately justified and understood in the broader and deeper 
framework that Catholicism and some other Christian traditions, such as 
Orthodoxy, provide. Finally, the paper will examine the problem of reli-
gious freedom as a case study of the application of this broader approach 
to contemporary political debates. 
1. DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF HUMAN DIGNITY: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Current debates about human dignity can be understood only in 
the context of the historical development of the concept and indeed 
many older conceptions are still present, often unacknowledged, among 
contemporary theorists4. We begin with a brief look at how the concept 
was understood in different historical epochs. 
Our western philosophical traditions and conceptual developments 
derive from two main sources: Greco-Roman philosophy and law and 
the Judaeo-Christian religious tradition. These two sources intermingled 
and cross-fertilised each other and even the later development of En-
lightenment humanism and subsequent atheism cannot be understood 
                                                 
2
 Quoted in McCrudden, 2013b, p. 2, footnote 4. 
3
 Guillebaud, 2004. 
4
 McCrudden, 2013a; Rosen, 2012. 
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without reference to them. This is also true of the concept of human dig-
nity. Enlightenment humanism could be interpreted as little more than a 
secularised version of the more ancient Judaeo-Christian understanding 
of the human being but without the metaphysical underpinning of the 
latter and using texts from Greek and Roman antiquity to sustain the 
claim. 
1.1. Human Dignity in Greco -Roman Antiquity 
Josiah Ober has suggested that the Greco-Roman understanding of 
dignity may be best expressed by what they stand against: humiliation 
and infantilization5. Positively, this led to two conceptions in the Greco-
Roman world: meritocratic dignity and civic dignity. Meritocratic dignity 
derived from one’s position in a hierarchical society and was character-
ised by the possession of a set of characteristics that were both personal 
(courage, virtue, uprightness in bearing, etc.) and also related to the posi-
tion of the individual and his family in the society. In this conception it is 
essential that others in society acknowledge and respect this standing 
(status). Ober argues that this kind of dignity was characteristic of archa-
ic societies, such as those described in the Homerian epics, although it is 
obvious that it is still very much with us even in the 21
st
 century. Civic 
dignity is different and arises at a later stage of Greek and then Roman 
society. In this setting, it refers to the nature of relationships within a 
body of male citizens all of whom are equal in the sense that they are 
equally free to participate in public affairs (Greek: politeia; Latin: res 
publica). Civic dignity, like meritocratic, is sustained by the mutual 
recognition and acknowledgement of others although, unlike the latter, it 
is not hierarchical at least among the body of citizens (of course, these 
stand above others such as women, slaves, and Barbarians). The classical 
locus of where civic dignity could be found, according to Ober, was Ath-
ens with its ‘democratic’ system developed after the Athenian Revolu-
tion of 508 BC Demosthenes, who developed the idea of civic dignity in a 
famous court speech in 346 BC, also said that non-citizens possessed a 
certain dignity and that Athenian law protected all persons, child, man 
or woman, free or slave, against intentional disrespect6.  
                                                 
5
 Ober, 2014, p. 53. 
6
 Ober, 2014, pp. 60-61. 
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The Latin word dignitas is close to the word decus (‘ornament’ or 
‘honourable reward’) and also decorum (‘honourable style’) and, ulti-
mately, to the Greek dokein (‘to show’) and doxa (‘shining manifesta-
tion’)7. But it also translates the Greek axia (meaning fundamental worth 
or ‘first principle’ as in our axiom). Millbank (2013) shows how both Ar-
istotle and Plato develop the notion in different ways. Both philosophers 
distinguish between the invisible (or inner) aspect of axia and the visible 
(or outer) aspect. For Aristotle, one’s axia is realised through one’s partic-
ipation in the polis as a citizen acting virtuously with other citizens for 
the good of the whole. But this position is akin to the meritocratic version 
and, ultimately, is limited only to the members of the city rather than to 
all human beings as such. There is thus a tension between the inner and 
outer dimensions which Aristotle fails to resolve because of the limita-
tions of his framework of the city state. Millbank argues that Plato is 
more successful in resolving the tension because his framework is not 
simply the city state but also includes a transcendent god and he is able 
to include women, children and non-Greeks in his notion as expressed in 
the Republic. The concept of axia would later be used by St Thomas 
Aquinas but within the context of the Church and the Trinity thus free-
ing it from the limitations of the two Greek philosophers8. 
Nevertheless, the notion that human beings have an intrinsic digni-
ty by virtue of their humanity only developed at a much later period 
with Stoicism and especially in the writings of Cicero. 
Cicero was not a member of the Roman aristocracy but, coming 
from a well-to-do provincial family, he aspired to join it. He was also a 
political conservative who wished to retain the values of the Republic 
and so was opposed to attempts to overthrow this by Julius Caesar and 
those who transformed the Republic into the Empire. Eventually, his 
opposition to the Empire would cost him his life. Cicero expounded his 
notion of human dignity in his work De Officiis (On Duties, Book III, 1-
4). Here he uses the term dignitas in two ways. First, and, unsurprising-
ly, given his aspirations to join the Roman nobility, in its traditional 
meritocratic sense to denote an elevated status in a well-ordered society. 
He describes how such a member of this society ought to live: cum digni-
                                                 
7
 Lebech, 2004, quoted by Millbank, 2013, p. 193. 
8
 Millbank, 2013, p. 197. 
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tate otium (with the dignity of leisure)9. The term ‘leisure’ or ‘otium ’ does 
not mean our contemporary sense of ‘idleness’ or ‘entertainment’, but 
rather the freedom from servile work necessary to pursue higher things 
such as philosophy. He goes on, however, to state human beings have a 
dignity simply because they are humans and not animals. As he states: 
«…it is vitally important for us to remember how vastly superior is 
man’s nature to that of cattle and other animals: their only thought is for 
bodily satisfactions. … Man’s mind, on the contrary, is developed by 
study and reflection…» (De Officiis, Book 1, 30). Thus we find in Cicero 
two senses of the word that have continued to be important up to the 
modern period: (i) dignity as status (relational) and (ii) dignity as an in-
herent characteristic o f humanity  (derived from Stoic philosophy). 
1.2. The Biblical Notion of Human Dignity 
The starting point of a biblical understanding of human dignity is 
found in the Genesis accounts of creation and, especially, the notion that 
man is made in the ‘image and likeness’ of God (Genesis 1: 26-27). Like 
many biblical texts, the meaning of the phrase is not entirely clear and it 
was much discussed especially by the early Fathers of the Church10. The 
meaning is also much discussed today by biblical scholars11. At least one 
interpretation that seems reasonably clear is that it means that God has 
given to man powers similar to his own and, in particular, dominion 
over the world. One illustration of this is in man’s naming of the other 
creatures just as God has named man (Adam). What the biblical author 
seems to have wanted to convey is the special place of human beings 
―male and female― in the world that sets them above all other creatures. 
While it is true that the concept of man made in God’s image and like-
ness occurs rarely in the Old Testament (it will later appear in some of 
the deuterocanonical Wisdom books - Wisdom 2:23 and Sirach 17:3), 
there does seem to be an awareness of man’s exalted position in the 
world. This is expressed in the psalm:  
Lord, what is man that you should keep him in mind, the son of man that 
you care for him? Yet you have made him little lower than the angels; 
                                                 
9
 See Rosen, 2012, pp. 11-15. 
10
 Phan, 1988. 
11
 Day, 2013. 
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with glory and honour you crowned him, gave him power over the works 
of your hands: you put all things under his feet (Ps 8: 5-7). 
Throughout the Old Testament, the biblical authors are awed by 
the utter transcendence and glory of God and, aware of man’s littleness 
faced with this glory, are yet astonished that He should place man in 
such an exalted position. But the Bible also refers to man’s capacity to 
reason which also sets him apart from other animals: «But there is a spirit 
in man: and the inspiration of the Almighty gives them understanding» 
(Job 32:8). Foolish men, that is, those who do not fear God and obey his 
will are compared to the brute beasts (Ps 49:21). 
The New Testament develops this understanding of man as a ra-
tional being who is above other animals. St Paul, in the first chapter of 
his letter to the Romans, also emphasises the rational nature of human 
beings who are capable through their reason of recognising God through 
his creation even if they foolishly turn away from it (Rom, 19-32). Faith 
and reason go together in the Bible and characterise our humanity, as 
John Paul II expressed in Fides et Ratio : 
Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the 
contemplation of truth; and God has placed in the human heart a desire to 
know the truth—in a word, to know himself—so that, by knowing and 
loving God, men and women may also come to the fullness of truth about 
themselves (cf. Ex 33:18; Ps 27:8-9; 63:2-3; Jn 14:8; 1 Jn 3:2). 
Thus in the Bible we find the two ways of understanding human 
dignity also identified by Cicero: (i) the hierarchical sense which places 
man above the rest of creation and (ii) the notion of man’s intrinsic worth 
because his capacity to reason places him above other animals. The justi-
fication of this understanding, however, differs in the two traditions. For 
Cicero, following the Stoic conception of the world, it is primarily be-
cause of man’s capacity to reason. The Bible also accepted that man is a 
being endowed with reason (or ‘wisdom’) but his dignity is also because 
he has been created in the image and likeness of God which has given 
him God-like powers of dominion over the world. Another difference 
between the Ciceronian and biblical concepts is that the Bible is aware 
that man has often failed to live up to this exalted position and has often 
been a miserable sinner, a lesson present in the very basic account of the 
Garden of Eden. This is also the import of St Paul’s letter to the Romans. 
But, even in his sinfulness, man was not abandoned by God and the New 
JOHN LOUGHLIN 
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Testament is the story of the measures that God takes by becoming man 
for man’s salvation by the Cross and Resurrection (see Eucharistic Prayer 
4 of the Roman Rite of the Mass: «You formed man in your own image 
and entrusted the whole world to his care, so that in serving you alone, 
the Creator, he might have dominion over all creatures». 
1.3. The Patristic Understanding of the Human Condition 
Christianity was born out of Judaism, entered into the Greco-
Roman world and, while being rooted primarily in the Biblical tradition 
of the former, inevitably had to confront the intellectual and belief sys-
tems of the latter. It retained much of the biblical understanding of man 
sketched out above but, very quickly, began to meet the philosophical 
challenges of that world. This was because Christianity, from the very 
beginning, saw itself as a universal religion destined to embrace all of 
humanity unlike Judaism that thought of itself as God’s chosen people 
waiting for the Messiah. For Christians, Jesus was the Messiah and he 
had come. Their task was to bring this good news to the rest of mankind. 
This meant developing a way of preaching the message in terms that 
others could grasp even if the message is also shrouded in mystery.  
Already, from the second century AD, Christian intellectuals used 
some of the categories of the dominant intellectual systems prevalent in 
the Roman Empire at that time, especially Gnosticism and neo-
Platonism12. The early Church actually viewed Gnostic beliefs, a mish-
mash of neo-Platonism, Judaism, Christianity and mystery religions, as a 
danger to the correct understanding of the faith. One of the ideas derived 
from Gnosticism that the Church rejected was that human beings were 
created by an evil demi-urge ―a kind of second God― and their corpore-
ality signified a descent into a material world that was in itself evil. 
The early Fathers such as Justin Martyr (AD 100-165), Clement of 
Alexandria (c. 150-c. 215 AD), Irenaeus of Lyon (early 2nd century- c. 202 
AD) rejected these ideas and affirmed the biblical idea developed in Ju-
daism: that there is but one God who created both the heavens and the 
earth13. Furthermore, human beings hold a special place in God’s creation 
and are in themselves good even though they have fallen from the origi-
                                                 
12
 Phan, 1988, pp. 43-63; Daniélou, 1973. 
13
 Phan, 1988. 
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nal state of grace. The Fathers based their theology on the phrase in Gen-
esis (1:26, 27): 
And he said: Let us make man to  our image  and likeness, and let him 
have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the 
beasts, and the whole earth, and every creeping creature that moveth up-
on the earth. 
There was much speculation with regard to the meaning of the 
words ‘image and likeness’. Irenaeus distinguished ‘image’ (in Greek 
eikon, in Latin imago ) and ‘likeness’ (Greek homoiõsis, Latin similitude). 
Contemporary biblical criticism denies there is any difference between 
the two terms and argues that the Fathers were reading it into the text 
eisogesis rather than exegesis14. Nevertheless, the distinction proved fruit-
ful in the development of Patristic theology and it would seem to be a 
valid way of developing the original text15. The image is constituted by 
man’s body and soul, whereas the likeness is a gift of the Holy Spirit, 
called the ‘superadditum ’. The idea that the body as well as the soul was 
made in God’s image was probably a way of countering the Gnostic idea 
that the body was somehow evil but not all the Fathers would have ac-
cepted this, as they argued that God is incorporeal and only the spiritual 
aspect of man could be in his image. According to Irenaeus, through the 
Fall man lost the likeness but kept the image, but the likeness was re-
stored through Jesus Christ: 
The image was man’s natural resemblance to God, the power of reason 
and will. The likeness was a donum superadditum—a divine gift added 
to basic human nature. This likeness consisted of the moral qualities of 
God, whereas the image involved the natural attributes of God. When 
Adam fell, he lost the likeness, but the image remained fully intact. Hu-
manity as humanity was still complete, but the good and holy being was 
spoiled16. 
Subsequent Fathers developed these insights in different ways17. 
Those belonging to the Alexandrian school such as Clement, Origen and 
the Cappadocian Fathers Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory Nazianzen 
                                                 
14
 Day, 2013. 
15
 Lossky, 1975. 
16
 Quoted in Phan, 1988. 
17
 Phan, 1988. 
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made extensive use of neo-Platonic ideas to speculate on what being 
made in God’s image and likeness meant. The Antiochean School and 
especially John Chrysostom were less given to speculation and John says 
that being made in God’s image means simply having dominion over the 
earth. The Greek Fathers did not emphasize the Fall as much as the Latin 
Fathers such as St Augustine and St Jerome but rather laid stress on the 
positive aspects of man’s restoration in Christ and developed the theme 
of ‘deification’ (theosis) of man. Being made in God’s image and likeness 
means being capable of sharing God’s life. It was Augustine who, while 
battling against the heresy known as Pelagianism, developed the theo-
logical concept of original sin although he never lost sight of the re-
deemed man’s future sharing in God’s glory (Augustine, On Grace and 
Free Will, 6 and 13 and On Nature and  Grace, 43 and 50)18. Besides neo-
Platonism, the Church Fathers, in both East and West, drew on the works 
of Cicero with his emphasis on ‘reason’ as distinguishing man from all 
other creatures. This Ciceronian approach was especially prevalent in 
Ambrose of Milan and in St Augustine, who had been his pupil. Am-
brose’s De Officiis Ministrorum  was modelled on Cicero’s De Officiis. 
Augustine, Ambrose’s student, declared that after reading Cicero, «I was 
urged on by a passionate zeal to love and seek and obtain and embrace 
and hold fast wisdom itself, whatever it might be» (Augustine, Confes-
sions, III, 56-57). 
Different Christian traditions developed distinctive spiritualities 
that emphasized various dimensions of Christian life. The differences 
between the Byzantine and Western traditions are well known. Western 
Christianity, following St Augustine’s doctrine of original sin, became 
increasingly aware of man’s sinfulness and emphasized the Cross, while 
Eastern Christianity emphasized the Resurrection and man’s deification19. 
Even within Western Christianity the religious orders and congregations 
that developed over the centuries, elaborated spiritualities some of which 
emphasized man’s baseness, others his greatness. But what is striking in 
all this diversity, is that the central notion of man’s dignity as a human 
being was never completely lost. The majority of even the most austere 
monastic movements that chastised the body and despised earthly things 
did not lose sight of the intrinsic dignity of the human being. Sometimes, 
                                                 
18
 Ramsay, 1986, pp. 66-71. 
19
 Lossky, 1975. 
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however, these movements tipped over into a version of dualistic Mani-
cheanism such as happened with the Cathars and the more extreme 
Franciscans (the spirituali) in the 13th century or with Jansenism in the 
17th century20. These movements, however, were condemned as heretical 
by the Church.  
1.4. Christian Humanism 
Although it is sometimes thought that the notion of human dignity 
began only with the famous Oratio  de hominis d ignitate  (Oration on the 
Dignity o f Man, 1486) of Pico della Mirandola, in fact, as the preceding 
paragraphs make clear, it is a dominant strand running throughout the 
Bible and subsequent Church history. Irenaeus of Lyon stated that Gloria 
Dei est vivens homo  which is usually paraphrased as ‘The Glory of God 
is man fully alive’ (Adversus Haereses, book 4, chapter 20). This Chris-
tian humanism can be found in the writings of the Fathers of the Church 
discussed above. Gregory of Nazianzen believed that man is destined to 
be deified , that is, to become like God himself (Oration, 21, para. 2). He 
thought every human being, including slaves, shared this destiny. Even 
in Christian monasticism, which was often more aware of human sinful-
ness, there emerged a Christian humanism. One can see this in the de-
velopment of the Benedictine and, later, Cistercian monastic orders, 
which produced great works of architecture, art, literature and music21. 
By the 12th century AD, Western Europe was experiencing an early hu-
manistic renaissance in which these aspects of human culture were 
brought to a high level of perfection. The designation of this period as 
the ‘Dark Ages’, invented by anti-Christian thinkers in the 18th century 
siècle des lumières could not be more inappropriate. The Cistercian St 
Bernard of Clairvaux, sometimes called ‘the last of the Fathers’ produced 
voluminous writings in elegant and poetic Latin22. Franciscans such as St 
Bonaventure and Dominicans such as Albert the Great and St Thomas 
Aquinas developed a true light-filled humanism23. It is true that this 
Christian humanism never made man into an absolute but rather saw his 
glory as entirely dependent on God’s goodness. It was also aware of hu-
man frailty and sin and taught that man could become worthy of this 
                                                 
20
 Barber, 2000. 
21
 Posset, 2005. 
22
 Merton, 1954. 
23
 Davies, 2004, p. 47. 
JOHN LOUGHLIN 
324 MEMORIA Y CIVILIZACIÓN 19 (2016): 313-343 
glory only by following God’s will as revealed by the Scriptures and 
through prayer and asceticism. 
1.5. Renaissance Humanism 
What became known as the scholastic method ―the use of reason 
and logic― of doing theology and philosophy had already begun in the 
11th century with the writings of St Anselm of Canterbury (c.1033-1109). It 
became the dominant method of learning and teaching in the new uni-
versities at Bologna, Paris and Oxford over the new couple of centuries 
and reached its peak with the great synthesis of Aristotelianism and the 
Gospel by St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). The new method was not 
always welcomed by older schools of thought more influenced by St Au-
gustine, as is exemplified by the great dispute between Abelard (1079-
1142) and St Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153) in the 1140s which ended 
by the official condemnation of Abelard24. Even St Thomas came under 
suspicion although he was never condemned as was Abelard. But it is 
true that scholasticism had a tendency to degenerate into a rigid and 
formulaic approach to understanding the faith and perhaps over-
emphasized the intellect in comparison with the will and the emotions 
although St Thomas would also write some marvelous poetry about the 
Eucharist25. Despite these different styles both the traditional Augustinian 
and the new scholastic approaches agreed that man was created in the 
image and likeness of God and that he was at the apex of creation. Each 
approach was a kind of humanism although each emphasized different 
aspects of what it means to be a human being, the power of reasoning of 
the intellect or the desire for God in the will.  
The legacy of the classical world was never quite abandoned. Plato 
was dominant in the Augustinian tradition while Aristotle had been re-
discovered and incorporated into the scholastic approach by St Thomas. 
Cicero was still a model for both Latin and treatises on ethics. With the 
12th century renaissance and the foundation of the new universities, 
scholars turned even more to classical authors both for Latin style and 
content. Already in the 14th century, Petrarch and Dante were bringing 
this broader approach. The Divine Comedy of Dante features Virgil as 
the soul’s guide through Hell and Purgatory to Paradise. This classicism 
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developed throughout the 15th and 16th centuries especially, but not ex-
clusively, in Italy with a new humanism albeit one which never aban-
doning its Christian inspiration. From the works of Fra Angelico to those 
of Michelangelo, one can observe the centrality of the human being in 
creation. Michelangelo’s David was inspired by the ancient Greek idea of 
male beauty. But there is nothing to suggest that Dante or Michelangelo 
were anything but Christian. Michelangelo’s painting of the creation of 
Adam, in which God reaches out and their hands touch, in the Sistine 
Chapel is the most stunning expression of the Christian idea of man’s 
place in creation. It is true that some authors such as Machiavelli (1469-
1527) were more inspired by the classics than by the Gospels and this 
attitude would develop in the coming centuries and especially during 
the so-called Enlightenment which invented the notion that the long pe-
riod of Christendom was a period of ‘darkness’ and obscurantism26. 
This is the context in which Giovanni Pico della Mirandola wrote 
his famous Oratio  de hominis d ignitate . Pico, unlike Machiavelli, re-
mained Christian but he exemplifies an excessive admiration of the clas-
sics and syncretized philosophical and religious systems that were, in 
fact, irreconcilable. His ‘oration’ was in fact the introduction to 900 ‘the-
ses’ that he claimed was a complete basis for all knowledge. In these the-
ses, Pico combined Platonism, Neoplatonism, Aristotelianism, Hermeti-
cism and Kabbalah. Pope Innocent VIII condemned the 900 theses as 
partly heretical (that is, his attempt to claim the compatibility between 
religious movements such as Kabbalah and the teaching of the Gospel) 
and Pico had to flee to escape punishment, although he did spend some 
time in a prison in Paris before being allowed to return to Florence. Nev-
ertheless, one can see how his version of Christianity still placed man at 
the apex of creation. Pico also anticipates some future understanding of 
man’s place in the world by emphasizing his freedom and his ability to 
shape himself and the world: «the human person can become the plastes 
et fictor sui, the ‘producer’ of his own self in a dynamic that is either re-
generative or degenerative»27. 
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1.6. The Reformation, the Enlightenment and the Rise o f Secular Humanism 
With Pico della Mirandola one can see an author struggling to keep 
within the bounds of a Christian framework as he draws on classical phi-
losophers to build his thought. At least one interpretation of the Refor-
mation is that it was a reaction against this syncretism of classical and 
evangelical approaches in favour of the former. Furthermore, the inclu-
sion of pagan themes and models in art shocked some Christians of a 
more puritanical disposition such as Savonarola (1452-1492), the Floren-
tine Dominican who organized a bonfire of such works before he himself 
suffered a similar fate. There were several such protest movements in the 
Church but the most significant and far-reaching was that initiated by 
Martin Luther (1483-1546), the German Augustinian friar who wished to 
return to the purity of the Gospel and the Church of the early centuries28. 
Luther’s movement attracted other gifted followers such as Swingli, Bu-
cer and Calvin and escalated into a full-blown crisis of the Western eccle-
siastical and political system known as the Protestant Reformation. The 
Reformation changed Europe and, indeed, the world, forever and pro-
voked a Counter-Reformation within Catholicism.  
The Reformers wished to return to the purity of the Gospel as they 
imagined it to have been before what they saw as the unhealthy attempts 
to synthesize it with Greek philosophy, whether that of Plato or of Aris-
totle. It is true that Luther in some senses was influenced by the Renais-
sance humanists’ insistence on returning to the original languages of the 
Bible to correct the prevailing Vulgate version and that Calvin used some 
of Seneca’s writings on law (he had written a commentary on Seneca’s 
De Clementia when he finished his legal studies and before he became a 
Protestant). Nevertheless, the Reformers, following one interpretation of 
St Augustine’s doctrine of original sin, were more aware of man’s sinful-
ness than his intrinsic greatness. They saw the use of classical models of 
beauty such as the David of Michelangelo or Donatello as more pagan 
than Christian. Later in the Reformation, Puritans went into iconoclastic 
rages rather similar to those of the Taleban and Islamic State in their de-
struction of great works of art29. 
But what was perhaps most significant during this period was the 
theological anthropology that derives from the Protestant theological 
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understanding of sin, grace, redemption and what had happened to the 
image of God at the Fall. The Reformers viewed man as utterly depraved 
(they used the term ‘total depravity’) and in total need of redemption. As 
Calvin expresses it: «The will is so utterly vitiated and corrupted in every 
part as to produce nothing but evil» (Institutes, Bk. II, Chapter II, Para. 
26). In contrast to what traditional Catholic theology, as found in the 
works of St Thomas Aquinas, grace could not build on nature but had to 
reshape it completely from without. According to the Reformers, man 
did have a greatness and was destined to share in God’s glory but only if 
he allowed himself to be reshaped completely by faith. This understand-
ing of the human being, which was most strongly expressed in Puritan-
ism, would eventually shape the culture, society and politics of entire 
countries such as the Netherlands, Scotland, the northern part of Ireland 
and the New England colonies. Lutheranism and Anglicanism, on the 
other hand, still retained some of the more humanistic traditions of the 
mediaeval Church.  
1.7. The Secularization of the European Mind 
The Reformation destroyed Christendom, divided Europe and led 
it into a European civil war fought partly on the basis of confessional 
adherence30. This hastened what has been called the secularization of the 
European mind31. Furthermore, throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, 
science in the modern sense of the word, meaning experimental science, 
developed rapidly and began to be applied systematically to create new 
inventions in industry that would transform the old mediaeval world. It 
is true that these developments had already begun in the centuries before 
the Reformation and especially during the Renaissance but they devel-
oped very rapidly during the period of the Enlightenment. ‘Science’ be-
gan to replace ‘faith’ as the dominant thought world of educated elites in 
Europe and the colonies of North America, although true atheists were 
still a minority of the population32. This led to a new form of humanism 
that at first rejected the God of Christianity in favour of a Deism which 
thought that God had indeed created the world, but then left man to his 
own devices thus exalting the human being33. Locke remained a Christian 
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and it is not certain whether Hobbes was an atheist or a believer but, by 
the middle of the 18th century, authors such as David Hume (1711-1776) 
and Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749-1827) declared that they had no need of 
God. The stage was set for the arrival of atheistic humanism34. 
1.8. Kant on Human Dignity 
Few if any of these authors, believers or atheists, denied that hu-
man beings held a special place in the world or that man, in some way, 
was superior to all other creatures. If one removed God from the equa-
tion, however, how could this proposition be justified? Do human beings 
have some intrinsic characteristics that lead to the conclusion that they 
occupy a special place in the world? The first and most influential mod-
ern attempt to answer this question came from the German philosopher 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant, although himself a Christian, sought 
to try to justify the special position of mankind without reference to God 
or to the notion of his being created in God’s image and likeness35. First, 
he distinguished between the terms price and dignity and argued that a 
price is assigned to something that can be exchanged for something else 
(as in a market). A cow can be exchanged for a horse on this basis. A 
human being, however, cannot be assigned a price because he cannot be 
exchanged for another human being or for another object. This is because 
man possesses dignity. This dignity, which distinguishes him from all 
other creatures, derives, according to Kant, from his capacity for moral 
reasoning: «hence morality and humanity insofar as it is capable of mo-
rality, is that which alone has dignity» (Groundwork  to  the Metaphysics 
o f Morals, 4: 434-5). Human beings have «an unconditional, incompara-
ble value (Würdigkeit)». For Kant this meant that human beings have an 
«inner transcendental kernel» which is the basis for their autonomy (dig-
nity = the exercise of autonomy). It is also the basis of his famous rule 
that one should «[a]ct in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in 
your own person or in that of another, always at the same time as an end 
and never merely as a means». Kant’s idea of dignity as intrinsic to hu-
man beings capable of acting in an autonomous fashion, who could not 
simply be the means for other human beings to achieve their ends, was 
also the justification for the notion of equality. Although it is unlikely 
                                                 
34
 Lubac, 1995. 
35
 Rosen, 2012, p. 24. 
HUMAN DIGNITY 
MEMORIA Y CIVILIZACIÓN 19 (2016): 313-343 329 
that Kant influenced the thinking of those who carried out the French 
Revolution, one can see that the idea of equality was central to this. Kant, 
however, provided a philosophical justification for the notion of equality 
that would eventually become the basis of modern democratic systems 
and notions of human rights. Kantianism is still a powerful philosophical 
trend in contemporary philosophy and, to some extent, lies behind 
movements such as virtue ethics. Its emphasis on freedom (‘choice’), also 
underlies secularist theories of justice such as those developed by John 
Rawls which has been enormously influential in Western approaches to 
law, public policy and the exclusion of religion from the public sphere36. 
As we shall see below, neo-Kantianism also contributed to the inclusion 
of the concept of human dignity in the drafting of the United Nations 
Declaration on Human Rights and the German Basic Law37. It has also 
been a target of criticism for those who reject the usefulness of the con-
cept such as Michael Rosen38. It should also be pointed out that Catholics, 
while accepting Kant’s idea that human beings should not be treated as 
‘means’ to an end, would not think of man as being his own end. Rather, 
the Catholic position is that man’s ‘end’ (telos) is in God his creator and 
cannot simply be an end in himself. Kant seemed to be aware of this in 
his statement that man possesses a ‘transcendental kernel’ but his fol-
lowers have definitely abandoned this idea in favour of an immanentist 
understanding.  
1.9. Anti-Humanism in the 19th and 20th Centuries 
Kant’s reflections on human dignity thus became one important 
strand in the secularization of the concept that would appear over the 
coming decades. But before turning to these developments it is important 
to note an early reaction against Kant’s notion of human dignity. Some 
philosophers, while rejecting the Judaeo-Christian cultural heritage of 
Europe, also railed against what they saw as Kantian ‘moralism’. Scho-
penhauer, in his critique of Kant, declared that «[t]hat expression, dignity 
o f man, once uttered by Kant, afterward became the shibboleth of all … 
perplexed and empty-headed moralists»39. Rosen comments that Scho-
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penhauer saw talk of human dignity as ‘humbug’40. This sceptical atti-
tude about human dignity as well as human rights was shared by Marx, 
who saw them as ‘antiquated, empty phrases’ of the bourgeoisie and by 
Nietzsche, who despised the Christian and Kantian versions of the con-
cept as expressions of Christian weakness41. He did, however, accept its 
usefulness but only in its original meritocratic sense applying to superior 
members of the human race ―his famous ‘Übermensch’ or ‘superman’. 
The ‘dignity’ of the rest consisted in being used by the superman to fur-
ther his own ends. Nietzschean nihilistic anti-humanism would subse-
quently become a strong (destructive) intellectual current within Western 
societies42. Some would argue that it was one of the ideological sources of 
Fascism and Nazism43. It is not too far-fetched to assert that it also lies 
behind contemporary cultural trends in art and literature that revel in 
ugliness and squalor, rather than in beauty and goodness44. 
Finally, a more recent rejection of the notion of human dignity, or 
at least of the idea that human beings occupy a special place in the 
world, different from all other creatures, may be found in the theories of 
Peter Singer. Singer is known for his work on ‘animal rights’ (1975) as 
well as an ethical system known as ‘preference utilitarianism’ (1993). It 
has the merit of drawing to their logical conclusions certain presupposi-
tions of atheism and nihilism. Singer, as a self-proclaimed atheist, does 
not regard human beings as having any intrinsic dignity nor does he 
accept the notion of the ‘sacredness of human life’, which he regards 
(rightly) as a concept derived from religion and the notion of a creator 
God. He also rejects Kantian notions of personal morality as the basis of 
human dignity. On the basis of these premises, Singer denies that human 
beings have any special place in the world and are really just animals like 
other animals. In fact, human beings are not necessarily ‘persons’ since 
he defines personhood as meaning that one is aware, capable of making 
rational decisions, can enjoy life and is useful to society (his utilitarian-
ism). In his own words:  
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… only a person can want to go on living, or have plans for the future, be-
cause only a person can understand the possibility of a future existence 
for herself or himself. This means that to end the lives of people against 
their will is different from ending the lives of beings who are not people 
… killing a person against his or her will is a much more serious wrong 
than killing a being who is not a person45. 
His positions are indeed useful since they show where this logic 
leads: his advocacy of abortion (a ‘fetus’ cannot be a person since it does 
not possess awareness nor have conscious life goals); infanticide: a hand-
icapped new-born infant may be euthanized if its parents wish this since 
allowing it to live may interfere in their life-choices; voluntary euthana-
sia is acceptable. Singer’s ethics is the direct antithesis of both the Judaeo-
Christian and Kantian notion that human beings occupy a special place 
in the world or that they possess an intrinsic dignity and, a fortiori, that 
human life is ‘sacred’. To adopt such a position, however, pulls the car-
pet from under any notion, not just of human dignity, but also notions 
such as human rights and crimes against humanity46. It also leaves the 
door open to experimentation on human beings or at least on human life 
processes in practices such as embryonic stem cell research, cloning, the 
creation of human-animal hybrids, etc. Today, the whole field of ‘trans-
humanism’ is largely built on the presuppositions of philosophers such 
as Singer and even of neo-Kantianism with its strong emphasis on 
‘choice’, rather than any notion of the sacredness of human life, as the 
guiding ethical principle.  
2. HUMAN DIGNITY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LAW 
The secularist optimism in progress and the Rousseauesque dream 
of man’s perfectibility that accompanied scientific developments in 19th 
century Europe, were shattered by the First World War which saw the 
destruction of human life on a vast scale. Soviet-style communism, Fas-
cism and Nazism were, to a large extent, responses to the First World 
War as well as to what many saw as the emptiness of liberal capitalism. 
The belligerence of Nazism and Fascism led, perhaps inexorably, to the 
Second World War in which there was an even greater destruction of 
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human life. Furthermore, the Nazi programme (at least partly inspired 
by Nietzsche’s theories of the Übermensch) to create an Aryan super race 
and the elimination of what the Nazis regarded as inferior races such as 
Slavs, Gypsies and especially Jews, or groups of people such as homo-
sexuals, the sick and the handicapped, all brought the issue of human 
dignity to the forefront of post-war reflection.  
Although the concept of human dignity had not previously been 
associated with human rights47, it is not surprising, therefore, that two 
key post-war documents made human dignity their foundation. The first 
was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights promulgated by the 
United Nations in 1948 whose Article 1 declares: «Everyone is born free 
and equal in dignity and rights». The second was the 1949 German Con-
stitution or Basic Law (Grundgesetz) which states: «Human Dignity shall 
be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state au-
thority» (Article 1[1]). Christopher McCrudden has provided an exhaus-
tive list of later human rights statements and of countries which have 
adopted a similar approach in their constitutions after WWII48. These in-
clude Japan (1946), Italy (1948), Israel (1948) and India (1950). Interna-
tional and regional human rights declarations which were based on the 
concept of human dignity include: the American Jewish Committee’s 
Declaration on Human Rights (1944), the US Catholic Bishops’ proposed 
Declaration of Rights (1946), the Cuban Declaration of Human Rights 
(1946), etc. The Geneva Conventions and the International Red Cross 
both based their positions after WWII on the concept of human dignity. 
Human dignity is mentioned in the preambles to many regional declara-
tions of human rights. It is not mentioned in the Council of Europe’s Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights (1953) but, according to McCrud-
den, it is included in subsequent Council of Europe Conventions49. 
It might be thought that, given the experience of the Second World 
War and the Nazis’ crimes against humanity, followed by the post-war 
commitment to human rights and human dignity, that it was self-evident 
that these should be based on the notion of human dignity even if the 
link had not been made previously. In practice, however, this has been 
unexpectedly controversial.  
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First, the concept itself, as used in the UDHR, was an amalgama-
tion of different religious and philosophical understandings that at-
tempted to produce something that could be accepted by everyone. The 
committee that drew up the Declaration was chaired by Eleanor Roose-
velt, an Episcopalian, and included the Catholic philosopher Jacques Ma-
ritain, the French Jewish legal scholar René Cassin, the Confucian scholar 
P. C. Chang, and representatives from 18 different nations. This meant 
that the concept was deliberately vague. Similarly, human dignity, as 
used in the German Basic Law, was influenced by Catholic natural law 
ideas, neo-Kantian philosophical approaches and Social Democracy50. In 
the end, however, no one of these approaches was designated as the cor-
rect one51. 
Second, precisely because of this ambiguity in the meaning of the 
concept, some legal theorists doubt whether the concept can be usefully 
employed in jurisprudence except as a vague reminder that we are deal-
ing with human beings. Some secular liberals, such as Michael Rosen, 
oppose it because they regard it as a Trojan horse for religiously-inspired 
attacks on ‘equality’52 or Ruth Macklin, who sees it as an attack on ‘au-
tonomy’, and particularly a woman’s right to choose abortion ―that is, 
those who invoke the concept dare to speak of the dignity of the unborn 
child53. Both of these attacks are aimed at the Catholic Church’s under-
standing of human dignity. Rosen54 claims that the Catholic Church still 
thinks of human dignity as referring to a hierarchical order in which eve-
ry creature has its place and which is therefore intrinsically anti-
egalitarian and anti-democratic. The Jesuit theologian James Hanvey 
argues that Rosen misunderstands the Catholic position by failing to sit-
uate it within the broader philosophical and theological tradition of the 
Church and how this evolved up to the present time55. Macklin’s attack is 
aimed (without fully acknowledging it) at the Catholic understanding of 
the human being as possessing an intrinsic dignity from the moment of 
natural conception until the moment of natural death. For her the being 
in the womb is a ‘fetus’ rather than a human being in the early phases of 
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his or her existence and every woman has the right to destroy this ‘fetus’ 
if they choose to do so. Peter Singer would approve (see above). 
Even Catholic legal scholars such as McCrudden or the LSE Profes-
sor of Human Rights Conor Gearty have doubts about the usefulness of 
the concept in jurisprudence, that is, in the possibility of applying it by 
judges making legal judgements. McCrudden argues that there is a cer-
tain basic core to the concept ―it makes an ontological claim about the 
intrinsic worth of the human person; a relational claim about how others 
should treat human persons in view of their inherent value; and a claim 
regarding the proper role of the state vis-à-vis the individual, i.e. the 
state exists for individuals rather than vice versa― but that, given the 
very diverse conceptions of human dignity held across jurisdictions and 
cultures, it cannot go much further than this56. In other words, the exist-
ence of different conceptions of human dignity makes it impossible to 
arrive at a universalist conception that could form the basis of human 
rights everywhere. Gearty, for his part, argues that it is difficult to use 
the concept of human dignity in actual cases of judge-made law on the 
grounds that «…the term is too vague and uncertain to be able to be ef-
fective on its own…»57. On the other hand, he believes that the concept 
can be realized in the UK’s legal system «through a combination of a 
legislative emphasis on particulars with a careful judicial deployment of 
the language of human rights»58. 
McCrudden’s minimalist understanding of the legal usefulness of 
human dignity was partially a response to the work of Paolo Carozza 
who had argued that human dignity could become a global ius com-
mune  for issues such as the death penalty59. Carozza, in his turn, has tak-
en issue with McCrudden’s minimalism and argued that the concept 
does indeed allow one to develop universal principles ―a ius commune― 
of equality, justice, and peace60. Carozza is arguing from a Catholic natu-
ral law perspective and he maintains that one of the problems in practice 
of developing a ius commune  is that there exists an international ‘human 
rights bureaucracy’ which adopts a ‘thin’ understanding of the concept 
in order to paper over the diverse conceptions (of course we have seen 
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this at work already in the drawing up of the UDHR). But, according to 
him, this «thin practical consensus on human rights alone is not self-
sustaining: it depends on extra-legal sources of commitment to respect-
ing [the] status and worth [of human dignity]»61. He goes on:  
The ‘common enterprise’, in other words, is an occasion for exchanging 
reasoned and substantive judgements across cultural and geographic di-
vides about the meaning of human flourishing, what it requires of us in 
justice, and how it can be variously understood and protected in commu-
nities constituted by their commitment to a common good62.  
This, in fact, could be a useful way of bridging the two concepts of 
human rights and human dignity that Millbank claims should be kept 
separate63. 
Despite the difficulties of operationalization in jurisprudence, na-
tional and international courts and administrations have in practice 
based their judgements on the concept. Examples are the dwarf-throwing 
case in France where a mayor banned the practice of men throwing dwa-
rves in a competition because it infringed the human dignity of the 
dwarf. The dwarf himself objected to the ban because he consented to the 
practice and, in fact, earned his living from it. The French courts and, 
ultimately, the European Court of Human Rights, came down on the side 
of the judge64. Their argument was that, even if individuals choose not to 
live according to the dignity of a human being, categories of human be-
ings, such as dwarves, would be harmed by such a position. In other 
words, dwarves are in possession of an intrinsic human worth simply by 
virtue of their humanity.  
3. CONTEMPORARY CATHOLICISM AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
The Catholic Church is today a major protagonist in these debates. 
As remarked above, authors such as Rosen and Macklin see this nega-
tively because the Church’s approach to human dignity stresses its rela-
tional and communitarian dimensions and they claim this undermines 
what they regard as the supreme value of personal autonomy. Indeed, 
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one could argue that most of the conflicts involved in understanding 
human dignity revolve around whether it is understood in a communi-
tarian and relational sense as the Catholic Church does, or in an individ-
ualist sense stressing personal autonomy as liberal neo-Kantianism does.  
In this section of the article, we will examine both continuities and 
developments within the Catholic position. As remarked above, both the 
Scriptures and the Church Fathers saw man as having this special posi-
tion in the world because he is made in the image an likeness of God, but 
also that he is a flawed sinner in need of redemption. His redemption has 
been achieved through Jesus Christ. We might summarise the Church’s 
teaching as follows: 
First, the Church has remained faithful to the scriptural teaching 
that man is made in the image and likeness of God and that this is the 
basis of his dignity. Man is like God because of his powers of reasoning 
and ability to make moral choices. It also teaches that man is made for 
the purpose of sharing God’s own life forever in heaven and this gives 
his life a teleological and transcendent meaning, that is, he does not exist 
simply for himself (as a neo-Kantian might claim) but for God and oth-
ers. It is this capax Dei, the capacity to enter into a personal relationship 
with God that distinguishes him from all other creatures. The Greek Fa-
thers, as noted above, called this ‘deification’, becoming like God. But 
becoming ‘like God’ also means behaving towards his fellow human be-
ings in the same way that God does: in love and mercy.  
Second, Catholicism has always maintained that human life (that is 
the entire course of a human being’s existence from the moment of his 
conception until the moment of his natural death) is intrinsically sacred 
because it is a gift from God (Catechism of the Catholic Church , para. 
2258). For this reason, Catholicism remains opposed to everything that 
would unjustly destroy or degrade human life in any of its stages. Mari-
tain called this ‘true’ or ‘integral’ humanism (in French l’humanisme in-
tégral) because it views human life in its totality65. This is opposed to 
modern Western social liberalism deriving from Kant which often redu-
ces life to only one or a few of its aspects such as ‘choice’. The notion of 
‘the sacredness of human life’ means especially protecting human life 
when it is most vulnerable ―in the early stages in the mother’s womb 
and its final stages before death. But it also means that we have a respon-
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sibility to create the conditions necessary for the full flourishing of these 
lives in society through adequate housing, health-care and education. 
Furthermore, it is at the root of Catholic concerns about experimenting 
on embryos, in vitro fertisilation, and other practices made possible by 
modern scientific developments and applications.  
Third, these qualities of a human person place him or her in a spe-
cial relationship with the rest of creation. The Church has always af-
firmed, and continues to do so, that man is at the apex of creation. In one 
sense, Rosen is right to point out that this is simply the old hierarchical 
notion of dignity as meaning one’s place in the created order of things. 
But the Christian interpretation of this, following Jesus’s words in the 
New Testament, is that we are called not to lord it over others but to 
serve them. Applied to the world, this means that human beings must 
exercise the responsibility of stewardship towards the goods of the 
world. They do not have a remit to behave in destructive ways towards 
the created order. Catholicism is opposed to notions such as Singer’s an-
imal rights or ‘deep ecology’ which tends to make the earth itself a deity. 
Another way of interpreting the reconfiguration of a hierarchical order 
which attempts to reconcile it with the notion of the equal dignity of all 
human beings has been advanced by Jeremy Waldron. He argues that 
equality is preserved when all human beings are elevated to the position 
of nobility ―a kind of levelling up66. 
The fourth feature of Catholicism’s understanding of human digni-
ty is directly contrary to the neo-Kantian idea that sees it simply as the 
increasing expansion of personal autonomy. The Church insists on the 
importance of personal autonomy but argues that it is not absolute. Au-
tonomy is constrained by our relations with other persons and by the 
common good: with other human beings but also with a personal God 
who has revealed himself in Jesus Christ and with our fellow human 
beings living in society. Kant’s original insight that autonomy was a key 
aspect of human dignity was correct but, in modern times, it has increas-
ingly been interpreted in Western societies in an individualistic way as if 
there were no other purpose in existence except to fulfil one’s own de-
sires. This is especially the case since the 1960s when an ever-expanding 
definition of ‘rights’ has not been accompanied by an equal expansion of 
duties and responsibilities. As we shall see in the next section (on reli-
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gious freedom), the Church also espouses personal freedom as a key fea-
ture of man’s dignity but this is a freedom that is exercised in relation to 
others. In Isaiah Berlin’s terms, it is freedom to  contribute to society ra-
ther than freedom from the constraints of society67. 
The Second Vatican Council (1962-65) reaffirmed these positions. 
The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium 
et Spes, December 1965) is both aware of man’s dignity but also of the 
challenges to this dignity resulting from his own sinfulness and from the 
changes in the modern world. Chapter 1 of the document entitled «The 
Dignity of the Human Person» presents the vision of the Council Fathers:  
Therefore, this sacred synod, proclaiming the noble destiny of man and 
championing the godlike seed which has been sown in him, offers to 
mankind the honest assistance of the Church in fostering that brother-
hood of all men which corresponds to this destiny of theirs. Inspired by 
no earthly ambition, the Church seeks but a solitary goal: to carry forward 
the work of Christ under the lead of the befriending Spirit. And Christ en-
tered this world to give witness to the truth, to rescue and not to sit in 
judgment, to serve and not to be served. 
The Pastoral Constitution admiringly describes man’s accom-
plishments in science, technology, democracy, etc., but is also aware of 
the negative aspects of modern society. Nevertheless, the overall ap-
proach (somewhat in the spirit of the 1960s in Western societies) is one of 
optimism and the Pastoral Constitution speaks of «the birth of a new 
humanism, one in which man is defined first of all by his responsibility 
to his brothers and to history» (Gaudium et Spes, no. 55). 
4. HUMAN DIGNITY AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
The Second Vatican Council makes a direct link between human 
dignity and religious freedom. In fact, the Latin title of the Declaration on 
Religious Freedom is Dignitatis Humanae taken from the first sentence 
of the document:  
A sense of the dignity of the human person has been impressing itself 
more and more deeply on the consciousness of contemporary man, and 
the demand is increasingly made that men should act on their own judg-
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ment, enjoying and making use of a responsible freedom, not driven by 
coercion but motivated by a sense of duty. 
It is the dignity of the human person that, in the eyes of the Council 
Fathers, pace  John Millbank (2013) is the basis of all other human rights. 
Human Rights had been a key theme developed by Popes Pius XII and 
John XXIII after the Second World War. The Council took up this theme 
and developed it with regard to religious freedom. Like the UDHR and 
the German Basic Law, the Council saw human dignity as the basis of all 
other rights. This includes religious freedom, which it saw as both a hu-
man and a civil right:  
The council…declares that the right to religious freedom has its founda-
tion in the very dignity of the human person as this dignity is known 
through the revealed word of God and by reason itself. This right of the 
human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in the constitu-
tional law whereby society is governed and thus it is to become a civil 
right (Dignitatis Humanae, no 2). 
Dignitatis Humanae  contains a developed understanding of what 
the Church means by human dignity and why it is so important. First, it 
declares that human beings must be free to seek the truth and, having 
found it, to adhere to it according to their consciences. For Catholics the 
truth has been revealed by God and is embodied in Jesus Christ, the Son 
of God. But it is also discovered through human reason that can discern 
the truth of the created order which follows God’s law. Although prac-
tice in previous centuries (for example, forced conversions by rulers such 
as Charlemagne) had often failed to respect this, it is wrong to force the 
individual person to accept this truth and they must be allowed to find it 
for themselves. Thus man’s dignity consists in being a rational person 
defined by his freedom to seek the truth, especially transcendent truth. 
One can see that this is in perfect continuity with the biblical, classical 
and patristic approaches outlined in the first part of this article. 
Man does not exercise this freedom in an isolated manner but ra-
ther with and for others in the context of society. It is this social and rela-
tional nature of his nature (as Aristotle and St Thomas would see it) that 
means he will form associations with others. Thus, religious freedom 
requires that he must be able to express his religious faith not just pri-
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vately alone or even in worship68 but publicly in society with others. This 
has consequences for the state and for society. Not only should states not 
attempt to obstruct the freedom of religious organisations to express 
their faith publicly and to participate in society, but they should actively 
provide the conditions by which this can happen (Dignitatis Humanae , 
no. 4). The Council also saw the role that families and parents play in this 
exercise of faith. Religious communities are made up of families and 
these are the primary educators of their children who also have the right 
that their children be educated in schools that respect their religious be-
liefs. The Council was keenly aware that rights entail duties and respon-
sibilities and this runs right through the document. Human dignity also 
demands a basic loyalty to the state in which Christians live. The excep-
tion to this obligation is when the state acts in a way that is morally un-
acceptable.  
Dignitatis Humanae , although quite short, is one of the key docu-
ments of the Second Vatican Council and was an important influence in 
changing the relations between the Church and states, both secular and 
confessional. It placed the Church firmly within the camp that promoted 
human dignity and human rights after the Second World War but it did 
so in a way that was largely in continuity with the traditional teaching of 
the Church on freedom and faith going back to the Scriptures, the Fa-
thers of the Church and theologians such as St Thomas Aquinas (who 
taught that faith must be freely chosen). It also reversed a negative atti-
tude to the modern world that had been evident in the 19th century, for 
example in Pope Pius IX’s 1864 Syllabus o f Errors which had denounced 
‘religious freedom’! Pius IX’s condemnation of almost all contemporary 
modern political positions is perhaps understandable given the massive 
attacks on the Church by 19th century liberals, socialists and nationalists 
but clearly they were exaggerated and it was right that Dignitatis Hu-
manae should restore some balance. But perhaps the most useful contri-
bution the Declaration makes is to remind us that human beings do pos-
sess an inherent dignity that is a human and civil right but that this 
should also be understood in a relational, social and communitarian 
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manner which is very different from the contemporary liberal individu-
alistic manner. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This article has shown that human dignity is an ancient concept 
whose roots are found in the classical period of Greco-Roman antiquity 
as well as in the Judaeo-Christian scriptures. It has been developed in the 
modern period through the writings of Kant although opposed by others 
such as Schopenhauer, Marx, Nietzsche, and Singer but also that it is 
susceptible of widely divergent interpretations. We might distinguish 
three basic positions in these interpretations. First, there are those who 
continue to see its usefulness as the basis for human rights, law and pub-
lic policy. But these are divided into two principal groups: those who 
follow the Catholic natural law and communitarian understanding and 
those who adopt a neo-Kantian approach which supports a more indi-
vidualist personal autonomy approach. The third approach is by those 
who deny its usefulness. These can be divided into those such as Rosen 
and Macklin who deny completely that is has any usefulness as it may 
undermine liberal notions of equality or autonomy and those, such as 
McCrudden and Gearty, who accept that it has some value but is difficult 
to operationalize in jurisprudence. Also included within this category are 
those influenced by the anti-humanism of Nietzsche and the peculiar 
ethical theories of Singer. 
Perhaps the richest and most satisfactory approach is that devel-
oped by the Catholic Church in the form of Maritain’s ‘integral human-
ism’ which can serve as a strong antidote to the various reductionist and 
destructive tendencies found within the other liberal or anti-humanist 
positions described above. Catholicism, of course, shares this position 
with other ecclesial traditions such as Orthodoxy, Orthodox Judaism (e.g. 
that promoted by Jonathan Sacks, the former Chief Rabbi of England69), 
and even some liberal secularists70. 
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